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reasonable time.. Humanity and equity might require indulgence
in extreme cases. Libellant received the hurt complained of
without fault on the part of the officers of the vessel while coming
into the port of discharge ; and after his discharge and receipt
of his wages, he travelled by land about ninety miles to the city
of Milwaukee. He cannot recover against the vessel for expenses
incurred by him in this city, and his libel must be dismissed.
ABSTRACTS-OF RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.
SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA.'
SUPREME COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS.
2
SUPREME COURT "OF NEW YORK.
SUPREME COURT OF VERMONT.-
ATTORNEY.
AttorneZy's Fees.-A demand by an attorney upon his client for a cer-
tain sum, as a compensation for services rendered, is only a proposition:
to receive that amunt for the debt, and if payment is refused the re-
covery cannot be limited to the amount demanded, if the services are
shown to be of greater value: NWillr v. Beal, 26 Ind.
BILLS AND NOTES.
Conitigency-egoiability.-7-A contingency depending on an event
which necessarily must happ n, or a contingency as to time of payment
depending on an act to be done by the holder in reference to the instru-
ment itself, to hasten or fix. the time of payment, does not destroy the-
negotiability of a note or bill of exchange: Smilie v. Stevens, 39 Yt.
The plaintiff held a writing as indorsee in words as follows: "'New
York, Aug. 11th 1865. I certify, that James Smilie, Jr., has deposited
with me five hundred dollars, payable to his order on demand with .inte-
rest from February 15th 1864, on the return of this certificate and my
guarantee of his note to his brother John Smilie, dated February 15th
1864, for the sum of five hundred dollars. SIMON STEVENS." Held,
that the negotiable character of this instrument is not affected by the
fact that it was made payable "on the return of this certificate:" Id.
I From Benj. Harrison, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 26 Indiana Reports.
2 From Charles Allen, Esq., Reporter ; to appear in Vol. 12 of his Reports.
3 From Hon. 0. L. Barbour, Reporter; to appear in Vol. 48 of his Reports.
4 From W. G. Veazey, Esq.; to appear in 39 Vermont Reports.
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- But the provision of a return of the maker's guarantee of the payee's
note for 650D to his brother John Smilie, is a condition that destroys its
negotiability, therefore the plaintiff cannot recover in his own name:
Id.
If the plaintiff could show a special promise By the defendant to pay
to him as assignee or indorser, and show the condition. performed, hi
r.ight recover, if the declaration contained such an allegation:. Id.
Demand and .Notice.-Where the demand of payment is not made by
the notary himself, but his certificate is founded on an entry made by
'his clerk, the act of the clerk is not to be deemed the act of the notary,
but may be proven as the ac of an individual, and is subject to the
ordinary rules of evidence: Gawtry et aL v. Doane, 48 Barb.
. Where the clerk who made the demaid and gave notice to the
indorsers in the name of the notary is dead, memoranda made by him
and entered in the register of 'the *notary, are admissible in evidence to
prove demand and notice : Id.
Admission of LiabiT4.--An admission of liability, by an indorser,
after maturity, is never held to be stfficient to overcame the want of
demand and notice without.proof that at the time of the admission the
indorser knew that there was such defective protest: Id.
Vaiver of Deman4d and Notice.-If there *has been no due present-
ment of a note or notice of dishonor, and the. indorser, after the maturity
of the note, supposing himself liable to pay the same, takes security
from the maker, that will not amount to a waiver of the objection of
want of due presentment and notice: Id.
t
It is well settled that when a loss to cargo, from leakage or otherwise,
occurs in the port where it is laden and before the voyage begins, the
carrier is liable for its value at such port. But when the logs happens
after the vessel has left the port of shipment, then the 'value of the
goods at the place of destination, deducting the charges, furnishes the
true rule of damages: Krohn v. Oec4 48 Barb.
CITIZENSHIP.
Agroes.-A free man of color born within the United States is. a
citizen of the United States, and as such is entitled to become a citizen
of any one of the several states, by becoming a resident thereof: Smith
v. foody etal., 26 Ind.
Right to Vote and Bold Offlce.-The right to vote and the legal capa-
city to hold office arc not essential to the character of. a. citizen. Alle-
giance on the part of the person, and the duty of protection on the part
of the government, constitute citizenship under the Constitution: Id.
10 CONFLICT OF LAWS.
Foreign Judgment.-Where judgment is rendered in another state
against a non-resident thereof, a citizen of Vermont, without process or
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notice being served -on him in the state where the judgment is rendered,
and where he does not submit to the jurisdiction by appearing in the
suit, the presence and attachment of the property of the defendant in
the state where judgment is rendered, give no jurisdiction over the per-
son or validity to the judgment, when sought to be enforced by action in
Vermont, either upon general principles, or under the Constitution and
laws of the United States. Nor does the fact that process was served
upon, or notice given to" the defendant in Vermont, or out of the state
in which judgment was rendered, add anything to the force or validity
of the judgment; such service and notice being regarded as a nullity:'
Price v. Rickok, 39 Vt.
Whether a judgment against a defendant who is a resident of the
state where the judgment is rendered, but temporarily absent, without
service of process or notice, is valid or not, is not decided: Id.
CORPORATIONS.
Subscriptions to Stock.-In a suit upon a subscription alleged to have
been made to the stock of an existing corporation, organized under the
laws of this state, where the name imports such a corporation as is
authorized by law, aprim facie right to sue is shown, without setting
out the manner of the organization or its specific objects: Williams v.
The Franklin Townshl@ Academical Association, 26 -Ind.
Estopel to deny existence off-The rule that a person contracting
with a corporation is estopped to deny the corporat6 existence is subject
to the limitation that if the -plaintiff assumes to be a corporation orga-
nized in this state, the name must be such as to imply such a corpora-
tion as is authorized by some statute of the state: d.
The rule does not apply to a suit upon a subscription of stock made
with a view to the organization of a corporation, when other acts are
required by law as a condition precedent to the exercise of corporate
powers. In such case, it is for the plaintiff to show that the requisite
steps have been taken to complete the corporate organization: Id.
CRIMINAL LAW.
E'idence-Randwridng.In criminal prosecutions where the guilt
of the accused is sought to be established by proof afforded by compari-
son of handwriting, the sufficiency of the proof given of the genuineness
of the papers offered as standards, is a preliminary point addressed to
and in the first instance to be determined by the court, before permitting
the papers to go to t he he cour having adjudged the papers
genuine, and having permitted them to go to the jury, it then becomes
the duty of the jury, before making comparison of a disputed -writing
with them, to examine the testimony respecting their genuineness, and
to decide whether it is established beyond a reasonable 
dout; and upon
this point they should require the same measure of proof as upon any
other essential point in the case. And the court should instruct the jury
that if they do not find, by such measure of proof, that the papers offered
as standards are genuine, they should not be used as evidence against
the prisoner: State v. Ward alias La Vigne, 39 Vt.
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I Once in Jeqpardy--Discharge of Jury.-When the accused is put
upon trial on a valid indictment, before a legal jury, ancl the jury is dis-
charged by the court without good cause, and without the consent of the
defendant, he has incurred the first peril, and the discharge of the jury
is equivalent to a verdict of not.guilty: The State v. Walker, 26 Ind.
That the jury, after ample time spent in consultation, is unable t4
agree upon a verdict constitutes good cause for their discharge: Id.
The jury should not be discharged until ample time. has been given
for deliberation, nor until the court is satisfied that an agreement is im-
possible : Id.
-A jury in a criminal case.was out nineteen hours, and then reported
to the court that there was no possibility of agreeing upon a verdict.
Beld, that the court was justified in discharging them: Id.. The discharge of a jury in a criminal case, because of their inability
to-agree upon a verdict, after a protracted deliberation, does.not entitle
the defendant Jo his discharge on the ground that he has been once in
jeopardy: The State v. Nelson, 26 Ind.
.Miller v. The State, 9 Lnd. 326, .Xorgan v. The State, 13 Id. 215,
and Joy v. The A6tate, Id. 139, so far is they hold that the discharge of
a jury in a criminal case, without the consent of the accused, because
of their inability to agree upon a verdict, after ample time spent in de-
liberation, operates as an acquittal, overruled: TUe State v. Walker,
The State v. Ndson, 26 Ind.
FoaME ADjUDICATION.
Plea of.-An answer of a former adjudication must show either that
the matter iii controversy was actually determined in the former suit, or
that it might have been litigated under the issues then joined: .Columbus
.q d Shelby Railroad Co. v. WatSon et al., 26 Ind.
HIRIEWAYS.
Eminent Domain.-The power to appropriate property in any manner,
without the consent of the owner, is in derogation of priyate right, and
such appropriation should not interfere, fdrther than public necessity
requires, with the right of the owner to enjoy his property: Edgerton
et al. v. -Huff, 26 Ind.
Wheie'a simple servitude is sufficient to answer the public want, the
court should, when it is possible byreasonable construction, so limit the
legislative enactment: d. -
HUSBAND AND WIFE.
Trover- Conversion.--It seems that, the administrator of a feme covert
succeeds to her rights in respect to her property, but in enforcing those
rights is not restricted in his remedy to the very remedy to which the
intestate was limited by reason of the personal disability of coverture,
whereby she is legally incapacitated to sue her husband, at law: Albee,
Admr., v. Cole,'39 Vt.
An absolute refusal by a party to give'up a noteou demand, precludes
him from setting up on trial the excuse that he had not a reasonable
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time and opportunity affoided him to comply with the demand, though
he was away from home at the time of the demand and had not the note
with him: Id.
Where a man makes an ante-nuptial contract by which his wife is to
retain her entire interest and control of her property, and after marriage
receives notes which she holds, as trustee or agent for her, and then
appropriates them to his own use and benefit, with the intent and pur-
pose of depriving her of her property, it is held to constitute a conver-
sion of her property in fact and in law: 1d.
MAlIcIous PROSECUTION.
Proof, in actions for.-To maintain an action for a malicious prosecu-
tion the plaintiff must prove: 1st. That the defendant instigated the
prosecution against the plaintiff; 2d. That such prosecution was without
probable cause; 3d. That it was accompanied with malice and termi-
nated favorably to the party prosecuted: Miller v. Milligan, 48 Barb.
Malice and want of probable cause for the former suit must both.be
alleged and proved. If there was probable cause, th6 action cannot be
maintained, even though the prosecution complained of was.malicious:
Ild.
If there is an absence of proof to show that the defendant was the
real prosecutor in the former suit; or, if he was, that he was without
evidence or circumstances justifying a reasonable supicion of the truth
of the charge then made, the plaintiff should" be nonsuited, and has no
legal right to ask for a submission of the facts to a jury: Id.
Probable Cause.-The question of probable cause does not depend
upon the actual guilt or innocence of the accused, but upon the belief
of the prosecutor concerning*such guilt or innocence: 7d.
If the party has positive proof of the facts,'in the affidavit of another,
and he believes the truth of that person's statement, and proceeds against
the plaintiff upon that proof, and under a belief in its truthfulness, he
will be deemed to have had probable cause for so doing: Id.
MASTER AND SER.VANT.
Yeglhgence of Servant-Liabilit, of Afaster.-A master is ordinarily
responsible for the consequences resulting to others from the negligence
or want of skill with which his employees do his business: Evansville
and Crawfordsville Railroad Co. v. Baum, 26 Ind.
But for a wilful and malicious trespass of a servant, not commanded
or ratified by the master, but perpetrated to gratify the private malice
of the servant, under mere color of discharging the duty which he has
undertaken for his master, no action will lie against the master: Id.
But if the act of the servant was necessary to accomplish the purpose
of his employment, and was intended for that purpose, then it was im-
plied in the employment, and the master is liable, though the servant
may have executed it wilfully and maliciously: Id.
These rules apply equally to corporations as to private individuals:
Id.
Suit against a railroad company for a trespass committed by a servant
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of the company.- The complaint alleged that the plaintiff had paid his
fare and was seated in the ear, when he'was violently assaulted and
beaten, and ejected from the car, by a servant of the company; that the
duty and employment of said servant was to provide seats for passengers
and exercise care for their comfort, and that he then had charge of said
car and committed said trespass in the course of his business as such
servant.
Beid, that the expulsion of the plaintiff from the car, where he law-
fully was, if done without unnecessary violence, would give a right of
action against the company, and as this state of facts might have been
proved under the allegations of the complaint, a demurrer to the com-
plaint was correctly overruled: 1d.
MORTGAGE.
Mortgagee in Possession-Rents and Profits-Waste.-The right of
'the mortgagor on redemption to call the mortgagee in possession to
account for rents and profits is an incident of the right to redeem, and
must, like it. be enforced at equity: Beaver et al. v. Durant et al.,
39 Vt.
The right to hold the mortgagee responsible for waste which occurred
.during the period of the mortgagee's possession, after condition broken,
stands on the same-ground as the right to an account -for rents' and pro-
fits, and is only a right at equity: Id.
-The law cannot imply that the mortgagor after redemption is entitled,
in the mortgagee's name -against his will, to sue for a breach of a cove-
-nant previously made by a third party with the mortgagee in possession,
relating to repairs; because, at law) it i% not the mortgagor, but the
mortgagee in possession, who is interested in the estate and its repairs,
and is entitled to damages for its mismanagement or waste. The entire
legal interest is in the mortgagee in possession after condition broken : Id.
M., the mortgagee in possession after default, let D. ocrupy under a
covenant wi)h him by D. to keep the estate in repair. L., the mort-
gagor, redeemed and sued D. at law in M.'s name and against his will,
but with an offer of indemnity for a breach of this covenant which
occurred before L. redeemed. eled, that the action could not be sus-
tained: Id.
RAILROAD.
'i pecific Performance-. Cattle Guards.-A suit for specific perform-
ance will not lie upon a covenant by a railroad company to maintain
and keep in repair the cattle guards upon the land of the plaintiff: Co-
Zumbus and Shdby Railroad Co. v. Watson et al., 26,Ind.
Negligence-Recklessness-Where the negligence of the defendant is
so gross as to iiaply a disregard of consequences, or a willingness to
inflict the injury, the plaintiff may recover, though he be a trespasser,
or did not use ordinary care to avoid the injury: Lafayette and Indian-
apolis Railroad Co. v. Adams, 26 Ind.
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RE3ovA OF CAUSE INTO CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.
An action commenced in the Supreme Court by one foreign corpora-
tion against another, cannot be removed for trial into the Circuit Court
of the United States under the Act of Congress of 1789: Ayres v. The
Western Railroad Corporation, 48 Barb.
But where the assignee of a foreign corporation suing another foreign
corporation, is a citizen of this state, the action may be removed, pro-
vided the claim is of such a nature that the United States court can
take cognisance of it: Id.
The 17th section of the Act of Congress, which provides that the
Circuit Courts of the United States shall not "have cognisance of any
suit to recover the contents of any promissory note or other chose in
action, in favor of an assignee, unless a suit might have been prosecuted
in such court, to recover the said contents if no assignment had been
made," applies to a claim against a railroad company, as a common car-
rier, to recover the value of goods intrusted to it for transportation;
such a claim being a chose in action: Id.
SHIPPING.
Bill of'Lading-Demurrage,-If a bill of. lading contains no provi-
sion for the payment of demurrage by the consignee, he is not liable
therefor, even upon his acceptance of the cargo; and certainly not, if he
assigns the bill of lading before any of the cargo as been delivered:
Gage v. Morse, 12 Allen.
,iabilit of Owers, for &~ppies.-In an action against the owners
of a ship, for goods furnished to the ship, on the order of the captain,
the plaintiff must give some proof to show that th~e articles furnished
were necessaries: _Ford et a1. v. Crocler et al., 48 Barb.The rule adopted in the courts of this country, while it admits the
rigt to confine the supplies thus furnished to such as are necessary7
eaves the decision as to what is necessary rather to the captain than to
the creditor: Id.
Tradesmen are not called upon, before delivering supplies for a vessel,
on the order of the captain, 'to examine whether each article ordered is
actually necessary to enable the vessel to make the voyage. If it is.
proper that they should be ordered on account of, and for the use of, the
vessel7 the vendors may rely on the captain to decide whether they are
necessary or not; and his order for the goods on that account is
sufficient: Id.
STAMI.
Appeal Bond.-The bond given on appeal from the judgment of a
justice to the Circuit, or Common Pleas Court, does not require a
revenue stamp: Viol v. Heath, Anderson v. Coble Topf v. King,
2g Ind.
Depositon.-The certificate of the officer taking a deposition is not
subject to stamp duty: Prather v. Pritchard, 26 Ind.
TAXES.
Exemptionfrom.-A steamship company, incorporated under the laws
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of New York, for the transportation of passengers and freight between
New York and Brazil, whose capital is invested in vessels employed for
that purpose, and whose office is located in the city of New York, is not
exempted from state taxation on its capital under the Constitution of the
United States, on the ground that the whole amount is invested in.
steamships engaged in foreign commerce, and in carrying the mails
under contract with the United States: The Peopeuj rel. U. S. and
B. Steamsnip Co. v. The Comm'rs. of Taxes,.48 Barb.
VENDOR AND VENDEE.
Reservation'of Water-Right in a Grant.-A vendor of land .may
reserve an assignable right of taking water from a spring situated thereon
through pipes of certain dimensions, with the right to enter upon the
land to make repairs, upon payment of the damages caused thereby;
and such right need not be annexed to any particular estate, or be
limited as to the place or manner of its enjoyment: Goodrich v. Bur-
bankj 12 Allen.
A vendor of land reserved to himself, his heirs and assigns, the right
of taking for ever so much water from a spring situated thereon, from
which water was then taken in a pipe to supply the grounds of a neigh-
bor, as then ran in said pipe, so long as the same should last, together
with the .right to replace the same with a pipe of a certain size, and
thereupon to take so much water as would run through the substituted
pipe, and to enter and repair the aqueduct at all times, upon payment
of the damages caused thereby.. The neighbor received the water under
a revocable license; and no part of the vendor's remaining land had the
use of water from the spring. Held, that the reservation gave to the
vendor an assignable right to take -the specified quantity of water, not
annexed to any particular estate or limited as to the place or manner of
its enjoyment: Id.
WATERCO-URSES.
Canals-Rights of the Owners of the Soil-The canals constructed
under the internal improvement law of 1836 were built for navigation,
and to furnish hydraulic power, and the proprietor of the soil is entitled
to every use to which the land can be applied consistently with an ease-
ment for the purposes named: .Edgerton et al. v. Huff, 26 Ind.
Right to take Ice.-The owner of the fee is entitled to take ice from
the canal, if the taking of it does not interfere with navigation, or with
the use of the water for hydraulic purposes: Id.
WrLL.
Guardian and Ward-Insanity-Pleading.-The appointment of a
guardian is not conclusive of the incompetency of the ward to make a
will, though the guardianship still exists: Robinson's Estate, 39 Vt.
Pleas by a contestant of a will that the testator before making the
will had been adjudged insane, and that a giudian had been appointed
over him, and the guardianship existed at the time of making the will,
held, insufficient upon demurrer: Id.
